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Executive Summary
The objective of this case study is to present a syn­
thesis of the links between government spending— 
in areas such as agricultural research and develop­
ment (RscD), irrigation, rural education, and infra­
structure [including roads, electricity, and tele­
communications)—and economic growth and
poverty reduction in China and India. The findings 
of this case study are intended to help explain how 
government spending on key investments can help 
meet the broader policy goals of improved growth 
and reduction in poverty through various channels. 
The study, using a common framework, seeks to 
broaden and deepen understanding of the mechan­
isms through which government investment results 
in pro-poor economic growth.
The overall picture for public investment can be 
summarized as follows:
■ Using state-level data for India over time, 
the study found that many types of gov­
ernment spending have resulted in reduc­
tions in rural poverty, and most have also 
contributed to growth in agricultural 
productivity. Different kinds of spending, 
however, have different effects on poverty 
and productivity. Rural roads and agricul­
tural research have the largest impact on 
agricultural growth and poverty reduction. 
Many investments in rainfed areas of east­
ern India offer the largest impact on rural 
poverty, but also contribute to higher 
growth in comparison with investments in 
the more-favored irrigated areas.
■ Using provincial data over time, the study 
shows that for China, government invest­
ment in agricultural RstD and rural educa­
tion have had the largest impact on both 
growth and poverty reduction. To elimi­
nate the remaining poverty in China, the 
government should place the highest 
priority on public investment in western 
China, where the majority of the poor 
reside, because the marginal returns to 
public investments, in terms of poverty 
reduction, are higher there than in other 
regions.
Your assignment is to recommend a public sector 
investment strategy for rural infrastructure to be 
considered by the government of one of the two 
countries discussed in this case.
Background
Investment in Infrastructure, Technology, 
and Human Capital and Impact on Poverty: 
Conceptual Framework
The aim of this case study is to improve under­
standing of the relationship between government 
spending and poverty reduction through long-term 
growth by reviewing issues and synthesizing find­
ings of major studies from the International Food 
Policy Research Institute [IFPRI], As shown in 
Figure I, public spending affects poverty reduction 
through different channels. Understanding these 
channels will enable policymakers to design more 
effective policies. This case study analyzes the 
impact of differential spending and investment 
strategies not only on economic growth, but also 
on poverty reduction and regional inequality. Addi­
tionally, it distinguishes the effects by geographic 
region.
This case study considers public spending at differ­
ent levels of government that leads to long-term 
growth through which the poor benefit. This type 
of spending is very different from targeted welfare 
or social safety net programs. This case study first 
reviews a framework for assessing public invest­
ment for poverty reduction. Particular attention is 
paid to how public investment affects rural poverty 
through various channels. This study then uses 
selected case studies to illustrate how different 
types of public investment can have differential 
impacts. Finally, this paper discusses the policy 
issues and offers policy options for a public 
investment strategy to achieve the twin goals of 
economic growth and poverty reduction.
Figure 1: Governm ent Spending and Rural Poverty
How Does Public Investment Affect Rural 
Poverty?
Public investment affects rural poverty through 
many channels, as depicted in Figure 1. For example, 
public investment in agricultural research, rural 
education, and infrastructure increases agricultural 
productivity, which directly increases farmers' 
incomes and reduces rural poverty. Indirect impacts 
come from higher agricultural wages and improved 
nonfarm employment opportunities induced by 
growth in agricultural productivity. Increased agri­
cultural output from rural investment often leads 
to lower food prices, again helping the poor 
indirectly because they are often net buyers of 
food grains. Redistribution of land caused by 
higher agricultural growth also affects rural 
poverty. Public investments in rural education, 
health, and infrastructure not only have indirect 
effects on wages, nonfarm employment, and migra­
tion through increased productivity, but also 
directly promote rural wage increases, nonfarm 
employment, and migration, thereby reducing rural
poverty. For example, improved infrastructure 
access will help farmers set up small rural nonfarm 
businesses such as food-processing and marketing 
enterprises, electronics repair shops, transportation 
and trade, and restaurants.
Investments in rural sectors not only contribute to 
growth, employment, and wages in rural areas, but 
also help the development of the national economy 
by providing labor, human and physical capital, 
cheaper food, and markets for urban industrial and 
service development. Growth in the national econ­
omy reduces poverty in both rural and urban sec­
tors. Understanding these different effects provides 
useful policy insights for improving the effective­
ness of national poverty reduction strategies. In 
particular, an understanding of these effects shows 
how public investment can be used to strengthen 
weak links between poverty reduction channels and 
thus to target public resources more efficiently. 
More efficient targeting has become increasingly 
crucial as many developing countries have com­
mitted to achieving poverty reduction goals using
the Millennium Development Goal [MDG] frame­
work with limited public resources.
Channels through Which Public Investment 
Affects Rural Poverty
Agricultural growth. This section will focus on the 
evidence of poverty reduction impacts of agricul­
tural growth for the following reasons: [1] the 
majority of the world's poor live in rural areas and 
a large share of their income is derived from agri­
culture; [2] growth in agriculture contributes to 
poverty reduction indirectly through increased 
rural wages and farm and nonfarm employment; 
and [3] agricultural growth may also contribute to 
poverty reduction in urban areas by lowering food 
prices for urban residents and contributing to 
national economic growth.
The most remarkable evidence on the poverty 
reduction effects of agricultural growth probably 
comes from the Green Revolution in South Asia 
from the late 1960s to the 1980s. In the late 1960s, 
the incidence of rural poverty in India fluctuated 
widely between 50 and 60 percent. The Green 
Revolution, based on the widespread use of high- 
yielding varieties [HYVs] developed jointly by 
national and international agricultural research 
centers, began in the mid-1960s. Over the next two 
decades farmers' wheat and rice yields doubled, 
tripled, or even quadrupled. The incidence of rural 
poverty declined from 64 percent in 1966 to 34 
percent in 1989.
There is also strong evidence of the effect of 
growth on poverty in rural China, which has seen a 
tremendous reduction in poverty over the past 
three decades. The number of poor declined from 
260 million in 1978 to 26 million in 2004 [Ministry 
of Agriculture of China 2005], The fastest reduc­
tion occurred during the initial phase of rural 
reforms from 1978 to 1984, which was highly cor­
related with agricultural growth stemming from 
institutional and policy changes in agricultural pro­
duction. Between 1984 and 1989, however, rural 
poverty began to rise and is attributed to stagna­
tion of agricultural growth during this period. The 
Chinese evidence convincingly shows that whenever 
agricultural growth is strong, poverty falls rapidly, 
and whenever agricultural growth is lacking, 
poverty reduction is slow.
In summary, agricultural growth is conducive to 
poverty reduction. The patterns of growth, how­
ever, and its distributional impacts also matter. 
Better distribution of production assets and more 
growth in the less-developed areas and in small 
farm sectors will foster more poverty reduction for 
the same rate of agricultural growth.
Rural wages. In the majority of developing coun­
tries, the bulk of poor people are either landless or 
live on small farms with inadequate land to meet 
their food needs. As such, they depend heavily 
upon the only available factor of production- 
labor. The poor gain from economic growth by 
increasing their productivity if they own land, by 
participating in the labor market, or both. For 
example, with the advent of the Green Revolution 
in India, the poor took advantage of extra labor 
demand and higher wages. Another factor of pro­
duction—land—is also crucial in giving small-scale 
and landless farmers access to rural wages. 
Thiesenhusen and Melmed-Sanjack [1990] found 
that land distribution from large-scale farmers to 
small-scale farmers sharply increased family labor 
use per hectare and, to a lesser extent, labor hired 
per hectare.
Thus, improvement in wages has strong linkages to 
rural poverty. Public investment in infrastructure, 
health, and education promotes these wages by 
supporting agricultural productivity and nonfarm 
employment activities.
Nonfarm employment. Traditional rural households 
in developing countries are viewed mainly as agri­
cultural producers and agricultural wage laborers. 
There is increasing empirical evidence, however, 
that rural households often diversify their activities, 
with nonagricultural sources of income often con­
tributing significantly to household incomes. For 
the poor, different forms of nonfarm employment 
are a source of supplementary income and are ways 
to diversify and spread risk across a number of 
livelihood strategies. For the nonpoor, nonfarm 
activities are an avenue to generate more income 
and assets in addition to other factors of produc­
tion such as land, capital, and technology.
Research evidence shows that nonfarm activities are 
generally associated with reduced levels of absolute 
poverty. Newman and Canagarajah [2000] con­
cluded that between 1988 and 1992 poverty reduc­
tion in Ghana can be attributed mainly to
improvements in both average levels of income and 
the pattern of its distribution in the informal and 
nonfarm sectors in cities other than Accra and in 
rural areas outside Accra. Datt and Ravallion [1997] 
showed that growth in nonfarm output, in addition 
to growth in agricultural output, played an impor­
tant role in reducing poverty across Indian states. 
The impact of the nonfarm economy on inequality 
is less clear-cut. A recent study of Ecuador 
explores these questions directly [Elbers and 
Lanjouw 2001], One key finding is that irrespective 
of income inequality, employment shares in both 
high-productivity and low-productivity nonfarm 
activities are associated with sharply lower absolute 
poverty rates. Thus, although inequality and 
poverty are clearly related, they are not equivalent. 
The authors suggest that the high-productivity 
subsector acts as an engine of growth by lifting the 
poor out of poverty either directly or by generat­
ing higher wage rates, while the low-productivity 
subsector acts as a safety net that helps prevent 
more households from falling below the poverty 
line.
Migration. Public investment can have a large 
impact on both rural-to-rural and rural-to-urban 
migration. For example, the Green Revolution in 
South Asia was initially concentrated in irrigated 
regions and only later spread to more favorable 
rainfed areas. Technological change, therefore, can 
contribute to widening disparities between regions. 
Worse, if technology leads to lower production 
costs per unit of output in the adopting regions, 
producer prices may fall, leaving non-adopting 
regions with lower prices and stagnant yields, so 
that their incomes actually decline. Interregional 
migration acts to buffer these gaps and provides an 
efficient way of spreading the benefits to poorer 
regions with limited agricultural growth potential.
In such instances, migrants leave their villages to 
settle permanently or temporarily in other parts of 
the country where there is a need for surplus labor 
or where there is a substantial increase in produc­
tivity. In India many people, both landless and land­
owning, came to Haryana and Punjab from neigh­
boring states such as Bihar because of the increased 
productivity of high-yielding crop varieties and the 
subsequent increase in labor demand. In the case of 
this so-called seasonal migration, these migrants 
would then return to their own villages. It is esti­
mated that the Green Revolution led to seasonal 
migration of more than a million agricultural
workers each year from the eastern states to 
Haryana and Punjab [Westley 1986],
Similarly, in China, it is estimated that there were 
more than 150 million rural migrants working in 
various urban sectors in 2004, whereas this num­
ber was negligible 20 years ago [Ministry of Agri­
culture of China 2005], Such a large-scale reloca­
tion of population has reduced the large number of 
poor in rural areas and contributed to much of the 
rapid economic growth of the past three decades. 
The migration from rural to urban areas and from 
agricultural to nonagricultural sectors in rural 
China accounted for 14 percent of total poverty 
reduction and an even larger share of income 
growth in rural China from 1978 to 1997.
Land distribution. Improvement in the asset base of 
the poor is viewed as one of the ways to lift them 
out of poverty, which in a poor agrarian economy 
means improving access to land. The relationship 
between agricultural growth and land distribution 
has been debated over the past several decades. The 
consensus is that better land distribution through 
land reform not only improves income distribution, 
and consequently poverty reduction, but also helps 
agricultural growth, which in turn alleviates 
poverty. The effect of agricultural growth on land 
distribution, however, has been less clear-cut. In 
fact, one of the earliest controversies about the 
Green Revolution concerned whether higher agri­
cultural growth worsened land distribution.
Critics argue that large farm owners who had 
better access to irrigation water, fertilizers, seeds, 
and credit were the main adopters of new tech­
nologies and that smallholders were either unaf­
fected or made worse off because the Green 
Revolution resulted in lower product prices, higher 
input prices, and attempts by owners to increase 
rents or force tenants off the land. A recent study 
by Fan, Hazell, and Thorat [1999] using state-level 
data from India for several decades found that both 
relationships—between changes in poverty and land 
distribution, and between agricultural growth and 
changes in land distribution—have been very weak. 
The fact that agricultural growth did not contri­
bute to worsening land distribution, however, does 
not mean that rural poverty is not correlated with 
land ownership. The rural poor are still either 
landless laborers or smallholders today. Therefore, 
future growth must be ensured to benefit these 
landless or marginal landholding peasants.
Food prices. Public investment in rural areas can 
lead to an increase in aggregate agricultural output, 
and this increased output will in turn reduce food 
prices. This process has proved to be one of the 
most important ways through which rural and 
urban poor people are affected by public invest­
ment [Scobie and Posada 1978; Fan, Fang, and 
Zhang 2003; Fan 2003], The impact of reduced 
food prices is particularly important for the urban 
poor, who often spend more than half of their 
income on food. These price reductions may not 
be very large in an open economy with low trans­
port costs. Indeed, owing to recent liberalization 
policies, many more countries now fall into this 
category than previously. Nonetheless, many poor 
countries still face high transport costs because of 
poor infrastructure, remoteness from world 
markets, or inefficient marketing institutions, and 
these countries may face considerably higher 
endogenous domestic prices even after market 
liberalization. For example, in many Asian coun­
tries, such as China and India, and in landlocked 
African countries, domestic prices still fall sharply 
when domestic food production increases suddenly. 
Furthermore, the prices of many traditional food 
crops also continue to be endogenously deter­
mined within countries because they are not traded 
on world markets.
The impact of reduced food prices on rural 
poverty, however, largely depends on whether the 
rural poor are net sellers or buyers of food. In the 
case of China, the majority of the rural poor are 
net sellers of food. Fan, Zhang, and Zhang [2004] 
found a strong relationship between lower food 
prices and higher rural poverty in China. In this 
case, the lower food prices resulting from public 
investment may offset certain benefits of poverty 
reduction, although the net impact of public 
investment on rural poverty reduction is enor­
mous. Ignoring the price effects would lead to 
overestimation of the poverty reduction effects.1 
On the other hand, many of India's rural poor are 
net buyers of food because of land constraints. As 
a result, they benefit from lower food prices 
induced by public investment.
1 How much net sellers will gain from increased produc­
tivity depends on the relative magnitude of demand and 
supply elasticities.
The Case of India
Background on government expenditure, agricul­
tural growth, and rural poverty. India is a federal 
country, with the national constitution defining the 
spheres of responsibility in making laws and exer­
cising executive power between the central gov­
ernment and the Parliament, on the one hand, and 
the state governments and legislatures, on the 
other. In agriculture and related activities, the pre­
dominant responsibility for legislation and exercise 
of executive power lies with the state governments, 
whereas the central government has exclusive 
responsibility only for interstate rivers and for 
fisheries outside territorial waters. Even expendi­
tures on agricultural research, on which the central 
government spends more than all the states put 
together, are disbursed through the states.
State governments are responsible for irrigation, 
power, agriculture, animal husbandry, dairy, soil 
conservation, education, health, family planning, 
rural development, forests, and more. Thus, it is 
important to look at the trends in state govern­
ment expenditures.
State government spending has grown substantially 
in recent decades, with a fivefold increase in real 
terms between the early 1970s and the early 1990s. 
The rate of increase slowed, however, from 8 per­
cent a year during the 1970s and 1980s to 3.14 
percent a year in the early 1990s. The expenditure 
items that grew most rapidly during the period 
1970-1993 were social welfare and rural develop­
ment. In terms of composition, 75 percent of total 
state government spending went to development 
expenditures, and the remaining 25 percent went to 
nondevelopment expenditures. Since the 1980s, the 
share of agriculture in total expenditure has 
declined from 30 percent to 20 percent, and irri­
gation's share has also declined.2 In contrast, 
expenditure on rural development programs has 
expanded from 6.3 to 16.4 percent of total eco­
nomic services, suggesting that resources may have 
been reallocated away from productivity-enhancing 
investments to those that have a much lower
2 in 2004 China was the largest spender on agriculture 
among all developing countries, followed by India. India 
accounted for 27 percent of total spending on agri­
culture in all developing countries included in the IFPRI 
government spending dataset [44 countries]. Together, 
China and India accounted for 70 percent of total agri­
cultural spending in developing countries [Fan 2007],
impact on agricultural productivity and production 
growth.
Technology, infrastructure, and productivity 
trends. One of the most significant changes in 
Indian agriculture during the past few decades has 
been the widespread adoption of high-yielding 
varieties [HYVs], During the Green Revolution the 
crop area planted to HYVs for five major crops 
[rice, wheat, maize, sorghum, and pearl millet] 
increased from less than 17 percent in 1970 to 40 
percent in 1980. The percentage reached 55 percent 
by 1994.
Although HYVs have been one of the major 
engines of productivity growth in Indian agricul­
ture, irrigation has also been an important factor. 
For all of India, the percentage of cropped area 
that is irrigated increased from 23 percent in 1970 
to 33 in 1988. In recent years, however, the increase 
has been marginal.
One of the greatest achievements in the develop­
ment of rural India has been the rapid increase of 
electrification. In 1970 only 34 percent of villages in 
rural India had access to electricity, and by 1995 the 
percentage had increased to almost 90 percent. 
This rapid increase in electrification contributed 
not only to agricultural productivity growth by 
encouraging more irrigation, but also to reductions 
in rural poverty through the generation of non- 
agricultural employment opportunities.
The literacy rate in rural India increased steadily 
from 23 percent in 1970 to 40 percent in 1995, but 
with great regional variation. Similarly, road density 
in rural India, as measured in kilometers per thou­
sand square kilometers of geographic area, 
increased from 2,614 in 1970 to 5,704 in 1995, a 
growth rate of more than 3 percent a year.
As a result of India's rapid adoption of new tech­
nologies and improved rural infrastructure, agricul­
tural production and factor productivity have 
grown quickly. Overall agricultural production for 
India grew at 2.64 percent per year between 1970 
and 1995. During the 1970s production growth was 
relatively low, at an annual average of 1.95 percent 
per year. During the 1980s it grew at 3.79 percent 
per year—much faster than most other developing 
countries during the same period. Since 1990 pro­
duction growth has slowed to only 3.17 percent per 
year. Similarly, total factor productivity [TFP],
defined as aggregate output minus aggregate 
inputs, grew at an annual average rate of 1.75 per­
cent between 1970 and 1995. In the 1970s TFP 
showed no improvement, but it grew by 2.52 
percent during the 1980s. Since 1990 TFP growth in 
Indian agriculture has continued to increase but at 
a much slower rate of 2.29 percent per year. The 
correlation between productivity growth and 
poverty reduction is very high, implying that 
productivity growth may be a more important 
determinant than production growth for explaining 
poverty reduction.
Rural poverty trends. The head-count ratio, defined 
as the percentage of rural population falling below 
the poverty line,3 is used to measure poverty. Rural 
poverty fluctuated between 50 and 65 percent in 
the 1950s and early 1960s, before beginning to 
decline from the mid-1960s until the late 1980s. It 
fell from about two-thirds to one-third of the rural 
population. In the early 1990s it increased to about 
40 percent during the implementation of policy 
reforms but declined again in 1993.
The long downward trend in rural poverty over the 
period 1967 to 1989 can be attributed to several 
important factors. As already mentioned, the rapid 
adoption of HYVs together with improved irriga­
tion increased agricultural productivity growth 
during this period. This change in technology was a 
direct result of increased government investment in 
agricultural research and extension, infrastructure, 
irrigation, and education during the 1960s, 1970s 
and 1980s. The stagnation in agricultural produc­
tivity growth and the increase in rural poverty 
observed during the early 1990s were due to 
reduced government expenditures in rural areas 
during this period.
Major Findings: Marginal Impact of 
Government Spending on Rural Poverty 
and Agricultural Productivity
Table 1 shows the total effect of government 
spending on rural poverty and agricultural produc­
tivity growth. Two measures are constructed. The 
first measure is the elasticity of each item of gov­
ernment spending, which shows the percentage 
change in poverty or productivity corresponding 
to a 1 percent change in government expenditure
3 This is defined as Rs 49 of income per month at 1973- 
1974 prices.
Table 1: Effects o f Additional Governm ent Expenditures on Poverty and Productivity in India, 1993
Expenditure
variable
Marginal impact of Number of
Elasticities spending Rs 100 billion at poor reduced
1993 prices /Rs million
Poverty TFP Poverty TFP spent
(percent)
RstD -0.065* (2) 0.296* (1) -0.48* (2) 6.98* (1) 91.4* (2)
Irrigation -0.007 (5) 0.034* (4) -0.04 (6) 0.56* (3) 7.4 (5)
Roads -0.066* (1) 0.072* (2) -0.87* (1) 3.03* (2) 165.0* (1)
Education -0.054* (3) 0.045* (3) -0.17* (3) 0.43* (4) 31.7* (3)
Power -0.002 (6) 0.0007 (5) -0.015 (8) 0.02* (5) 2.9 (7)
Soil and water -0.0004 (7) 0 (6) -0.035* (7) 0 [6) 6.7* (6)
Rural development -0.019* (4) n.a. -0.15 (5) n.a. 27.8* [4]
Health -0.0007 (8) n.a. -0.02 (4) n.a. 4.0 [8]
Source: Fan, Hazell and Thorat, 1999
Note: Numbers in parentheses are ranks. TFP is total factor productivity, n.a. is not available. 
* denotes significant at the 5 percent level.
on that item. The second measure is the marginal 
return for an additional Rs 100 billion of govern­
ment expenditure. The second measure is more 
useful because it compares the relative benefits of 
equal incremental increases in expenditures and 
thus provides crucial information for policy makers 
as they set government spending priorities to 
further increase productivity and reduce rural 
poverty.
The results show that government expenditure on 
roads had the largest impact on rural poverty. If 
the government increased investment in roads by 
Rs 100 billion, the incidence of rural poverty would 
be reduced by 0.9 percent. Further, for each Rs I 
million increase in investment in roads, 165 poor 
people would be lifted above the poverty line. 
These impacts on poverty are nearly twice as large 
as those of the next-best poverty reducer- 
government investment in agricultural research and 
development (RscD).
Investment in roads not only reduces rural poverty 
through productivity growth, but also increases 
nonagricultural employment opportunities and 
leads to higher wages. The productivity effect 
accounts for 24 percent of the total impact on 
poverty, nonagricultural employment accounts for 
55 percent, and increases in rural wages account 
for the remaining 21 percent.
Government investment in agricultural RstD had 
the second-largest impact on rural poverty but the 
largest impact on growth in TFP. Another Rs 100 
billion of investment in R&D would increase TFP 
growth by almost 7 percent and reduce the inci­
dence of rural poverty by 0.5 percent. Moreover, 
another Rs 1 million spent on RstD would raise 91 
poor people above the poverty line. RstD has a 
smaller impact on poverty than roads because it 
affects poverty only through improved produc­
tivity, and it has not been particularly targeted to 
the poor by the government.
Government spending on education had the third- 
largest impact on rural poverty reduction. An addi­
tional Rs 1 million spent on education would raise 
32 poor people above the poverty line. Most of 
this effect comes through greater nonfarm em­
ployment opportunities and increased wages.
Government expenditure on rural development had 
the fourth-Iargest impact on poverty reduction. An 
additional Rs 1 million of expenditure would raise 
28 people above the poverty line. Unlike other 
investments, however, rural development expendi­
tures had no distinct impact on TFP growth in 
agriculture and thus do not provide a long-term 
solution to the poverty problem. Government 
expenditures on soil and water conservation and 
health had small impacts on rural poverty and no
discernible impact on agricultural productivity 
growth.
Summarizing the Main Findings
The results show that government spending on 
productivity-enhancing investments [especially agri­
cultural research and extension], rural infra­
structure (especially roads and education], and rural 
development targeted to the rural poor all contri­
buted to reductions in rural poverty, and most of 
them also contribute to growth in agricultural 
productivity. But their effects on poverty and 
productivity differ greatly.
The study also estimated the marginal returns to 
agricultural productivity and poverty reduction 
from additional government investments on differ­
ent technology, infrastructure, and social invest­
ments. Additional government expenditure on 
roads had the largest impact on poverty reduction 
as well as a significant impact on productivity 
growth. It is thus clearly a dominant strategy. 
Additional government spending on agricultural 
research and extension had the largest impact on 
agricultural productivity growth and also led to 
large benefits for the rural poor. Additional gov­
ernment spending on education had the third- 
largest impact on rural poverty, and additional irri­
gation investment had the third-largest impact on 
agricultural productivity growth. Moreover, addi­
tional government spending on rural development 
contributed to reductions in rural poverty, but its 
impact was smaller than expenditures on roads, 
agricultural R&D, and education. Finally, additional 
government expenditures on soil and water conser­
vation and health had no impact on productivity 
growth, and their effects on poverty alleviation 
through employment generation and wage 
increases were negligible.
The C ase of C hina
Background on government expenditure, growth, 
inequality, and rural poverty. China is one of the 
few developing countries that has made remarkable 
strides in reducing the total number of poor 
people during the past two decades (World Bank 
2000], Although economic reforms began in the 
late 1970s, it would have been impossible to achieve 
rapid economic growth and poverty reduction 
without several decades of government investment. 
The case study identifies the different channels
through which government investments affect 
growth, inequality, and poverty.
Trends in growth, poverty, and income distribu­
tion. Per capita income in rural China was 
extremely low before the reforms in 1978. In 1978 
average income per rural resident was only about 
US$150 (Fan, Zhang, and Zhang 2004], China was 
one of the poorest countries in the world, and 33 
percent of the total rural population was below the 
poverty line, without access to sufficient food or 
income to maintain a healthy and productive life.
This situation changed dramatically after the intro­
duction of rural reforms in 1978. Per capita income 
increased from 220 yuan in 1978 to 522 yuan in 
1984, a growth rate of 15 percent a year. The 
income gains were shared widely enough to cut the 
number of poor, and by 1984 only 11 percent of the 
rural population remained below the poverty line. 
During the second stage of reforms [1985-1989], 
rural income continued to increase but at a much 
slower rate of 3 percent a year. This slowdown was 
mainly due to stagnation of agricultural production 
after the reforms. Over the same period rural 
income distribution became much less egalitarian, 
and the Gini index rose from 0.264 to 0.301. The 
ratio of per capita rural income in coastal regions 
to that in other regions also increased, from 1.21 to 
1.51 (Zhang and Kanbur 2001], Because development 
of the nonfarm sector was concentrated mostly in 
the coastal areas, where per capita income was 
already high and poverty incidence much smaller 
than elsewhere, the number of poor increased from 
89 million in 1984 to 103 million in 1989, a net gain 
of 14 million in five years.
Only in 1990 did rural poverty begin to decline 
again. The number of rural poor dropped 9 
percent a year, from 103 million in 1989 to 50 
million in 1997. Additionally, the rate of rural 
poverty reduction was faster than that of income 
growth (5 percent a year] during the period, 
showing that factors other than income growth 
were at play. In 1995 the government set a target of 
eliminating all rural poverty by 2000. To accom­
plish this objective, it introduced a series of policies 
and committed substantial financial resources.
Although rural residents earned less than half their 
urban cohorts in 1978, with the success of the 
reforms, that percentage increased to 59 percent in 
1983. By 1997, however, it had declined to 40
percent, mainly owing to fast growth in urban areas 
and relatively sluggish rural earnings. Poverty in 
China is thus mainly a rural phenomenon, and the 
urban poor are relatively few (Park, Wang, and Wu 
2002], In 1990 average per capita income among 
the poorest 5 percent of urban residents was 689 
yuan—more than double the urban absolute 
poverty line of 321 yuan and greater than the per 
capita income of 65 percent of rural residents. 
Higher income levels accompanied by annual con­
sumer food subsidies of at least 200 yuan per 
urban recipient left the urban population much 
better nourished than their rural counterparts.
Why was the government antipoverty program so 
successful? Before 1979 the major national objective 
of rural policy was to provide cheap food, capital, 
and labor for urban residents and industrial devel­
opment. Urban and industrial-biased development 
strategies were implemented at farmers' expense. 
Hence, reducing rural poverty was not a priority of 
the government's policy agenda during the pre­
reform period.
China's poverty alleviation strategy developed in 
three steps. Before 1984 social welfare programs 
were used mainly to subsidize poor families, and no 
formal strategy existed for reducing the number of 
poor in rural areas. From 1984 to 1995, the gov­
ernment pursued a strategy of regional targeting 
whose objective was to alleviate poverty by devel­
oping regional or local economies. Because the 
extremely poor were concentrated in remote areas 
with limited access to roads and other infra­
structure, this regional development policy did not 
trickle down to them.
After 1996 the government adopted a food-for- 
work program intended to build the necessary 
infrastructure in poor rural areas. The scheme pro­
vided a fund through which roads, irrigation, and 
other projects were carried out by extremely poor 
farmers. Individuals employed on the projects 
sometimes received food or vouchers that could be 
exchanged for food and other necessities.
Trends in Public Investment
Patterns in R&D expenditure. China invested about 
10-13 percent of total RstD expenditures in agricul­
ture during the past four decades. The
development of China's research personnel,4 how­
ever, has not matched the pattern of funds allo­
cated to research. By 1973 about 10,000 scientists 
worked in the Chinese system. From 1973 to 1990, 
the number of research personnel increased 
rapidly, to almost 60,000 researchers—an annual 
rate of growth of 10 percent. After 1995 the num­
ber of researchers declined marginally to about 
53,000 in 1997.
The regional pattern of R&D expenditures reveals 
that the northwest region (Gansu, Shaanxi, 
Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang] spent much less 
than coastal areas, and expenditures of the former 
were stagnant or even declining in the 1990s.
Several studies have quantified the effects and 
returns of research investment on agricultural pro­
duction (Fan and Pardey 1997; Fan 2000], Huang, 
Rozelle, and Rosegrant (1999] suggest that if China 
increased its investment in agricultural research and 
irrigation by 4.5 percent per year, it would become 
a net exporter of grains by 2020. With every 1 
percent increase in agricultural research and irriga­
tion investment, China could produce an additional 
21 million metric tons of grain in 2010 and an addi­
tional 36 million metric tons in 2020.
irrigation. Investment in irrigation increased 
negligibly from 1976 to 1990. During this period 
there was no increase in irrigated areas in Chinese 
agricultural production. In response to a grain 
shortfall and large imports in 1994-1995, the gov­
ernment increased its investment in irrigation in 
1996 and 1997. Among all the regions, the north­
west accounted for the largest increase in the 
1990s, followed by the northern China Plain. 
Investment in the northeast and southwest 
remained stagnant during most of the 1990s.
Education. After 1978 China adopted the "nine-year 
compulsory schooling" education policy, which 
implied that all children had to attend school for at 
least nine years to finish both primary and junior 
high school. As a result of these efforts, the illi­
teracy rate of the general population 15 years and 
older declined from 48 percent in 1970 to less than 
10 percent in 1997. Labor quality improved substan­
tially and provided opportunities for farmers to use
4 Research personnel are defined as researchers who have 
at least a bachelor's degree and one to two years of 
research experience.
modern farming technology and to engage in non­
farm activities in both rural towns and urban 
industrial centers.
Despite extraordinary success in basic education in 
China, many poor were not reached by govern­
ment efforts. Illiteracy was highest in the western 
region to begin with, and its rate of decline was the 
lowest of all provinces. According to official statis­
tics, in the poorer half of the townships of 35 
counties supported by a World Bank project in 
Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi, average enrollment 
was at least 10 percentage points lower than the 
national average for the same age group [Piazza and 
Liang 1998],
Infrastructure. Government investment in rural 
road construction increased very little over the 
period 1953 to 1976. Nonetheless, the length of 
roads increased gradually. After 1985 the govern­
ment increased its investment in roads, particularly 
high-quality roads such as highways connecting 
major industrial centers in coastal areas.
The greatest achievement in rural China was the 
rapid increase in electrification. Investment in 
power increased 90-fold. The percentage of villages 
with access to electricity was 97 percent in 1996, 
and more than 95 percent of households had an 
electrical connection. This percentage was much 
higher than that of India in the same year.
Before 1980 government investment in rural tele­
communications was very low. Investment increased 
from 3 million yuan in 1953 to 237 million yuan in 
1980. Large-scale development occurred only 
during recent years, with the number of rural tele­
phones increasing from 3.4 million in 1992 to 17.9 
million in 1997. This increase was a result of both 
public and private investments in the sector. During 
the period 1980 to 1997, public investment in tele­
communications alone increased more than 10-fold.
Marginal Effects of Public Spending on 
Growth and Poverty Reduction
Table 2 shows the marginal effects of government 
spending on agricultural and nonagricultural pro­
duction and rural poverty for the three regions 
and for China as a whole. The effects are measured 
as the returns in yuan or the number of poor 
people brought out of poverty per unit of spend­
ing in 1997. These measures are useful in comparing
the relative benefits of additional units of expendi­
ture on different items in different regions for 
setting priorities for government expenditure to 
further increase production and reduce rural 
poverty.
For the country as a whole, government expendi­
ture on education had the largest impact on 
reducing poverty. In addition, it had the second- 
largest return for agricultural gross domestic 
product (GDP), and the third-Iargest return for 
nonfarm GDP and overall rural GDP. Thus, invest­
ing more in education was the dominant "win-win" 
strategy. For every 10,000 yuan invested, some 30 
percent more are brought out of poverty com­
pared with RstD investments, which had the 
second-largest poverty reduction effect. Investment 
in agricultural RstD had the largest impact on agri­
cultural GDP and overall rural GDP.
Government expenditure on rural infrastructure 
also made large contributions to poverty reduction. 
Among the infrastructure variables considered in 
the study, the impact of roads was particularly 
large. For every 10,000 yuan invested, 3.2 poor 
people were lifted above the poverty line. Roads 
thus ranked third in poverty reduction impact, 
after education and RstD. in terms of impact on 
growth, for every yuan invested in roads, 8.83 yuan 
in rural GDP was produced, only slightly less than 
the return on RstD investments. Roads also yielded 
the largest return to rural nonfarm GDP, at 6.71 
yuan for every yuan invested, which was 35 percent 
higher than the return to education investment. 
With respect to agricultural GDP, the return to 
road investment ranked third, after RstD and 
education investments.
Although electricity investment showed low 
returns for both agricultural and nonagricultural 
GDP, it ranked fourth in poverty impact. For every 
10,000 yuan invested, 2.3 people were brought out 
of poverty. For rural telephony, investments had 
favorable returns for both agricultural and non­
agricultural GDP, and the impact on rural poverty 
was similar to that of electricity investments.
For the country as a whole, irrigation investment 
had a relatively negligible impact on rural poverty 
reduction, although its economic returns were still 
positive and higher than those for electricity 
investment. This low impact may occur because







Returns to total rural GDP from investments in 
[yuan per yuan expenditure]:
R&D 8.60 10.02 12.96 9.59
Irrigation 2.39 1.75 1.56 1.88
Roads 8.38 13.73 4.29 8.83
Education 9.75 7.78 5.06 8.68
Electricity 1.52 1.35 0.61 1.26
Telephone 7.12 8.54 4.13 6.98
Returns to agricultural GDP from investments in 
[yuan per yuan expenditure]:
R&D 8.60 10.02 12.69 9.59
Irrigation 2.39 1.75 1.56 1.88
Roads 1.67 3.84 1.92 2.12
Education 3.53 3.66 3.28 3.71
Electricity 0.55 0.63 0.40 0.54
Telephone 1.58 2.64 1.99 1.91
Returns to nonfarm GDP from investments in 
[yuan per yuan expenditure]:
Roads 6.71 9.89 2.37 6.71
Education 6.22 4.13 1.78 4.97
Electricity 0.97 0.71 0.21 0.72
Telephone 5.54 5.91 2.14 5.07
Returns to poverty reduction from investments in 
(number of poor reduced per 10,000 yuan
expenditure]:
RstD 1.99 4.40 33.12 6.79
Irrigation 0.55 0.77 4.06 1.33
Roads 0.83 3.61 10.73 3.22
Education 2.73 5.38 28.66 8.80
Electricity 0.76 1.65 6.17 2.27
Telephone 0.60 1.90 8.51 2.21
Poverty loan 0.88 0.75 1.49 1.13
Source: Fan, Zhang and Zhang 2004
Notes: The parameters from the productivity functions were used to compute the returns to GDP. The marginal returns 
were calculated by multiplying the production elasticities by partial productivity of each spending item.
irrigation affects poverty reduction solely through 
agricultural productivity.
With respect to rates of return for growth in agri­
culture, RscD investment had the highest returns in
the western region, whereas irrigation investment 
had the highest return in the coastal region. For 
education and rural infrastructure [roads, elec­
tricity, and telecommunications], the central region 
had the highest returns. In the coastal region, a
large amount of land had been converted for non- 
agricultural use owing to rapid industrialization. In 
contrast, land in the western region is more 
marginal, with limited water and soil quality. There­
fore, major growth potential for agricultural pro­
duction lies in the central region, where land is 
relatively scarce and agricultural production is still 
the main source of farmers' income. Not sur­
prisingly, most government expenditures had their 
largest impact on rural nonfarm GDP in the coastal 
and central areas.
Impact on Regional Inequality
The contributions of each of the factors of pro­
duction to inequality in agricultural, nonagricul- 
tural, and total labor productivity are assessed. 
Regional inequality in agricultural labor produc­
tivity has not changed much. The contributions of 
three conventional inputs [capital, labor, and land] 
declined, whereas the contributions of most public 
investments, especially R&D, electrification, and 
telephones, increased. Public investment's contribu­
tion to regional inequality in agricultural labor 
productivity increased from 11 percent to 22.1 
percent during the period.
In contrast to agricultural productivity, regional 
inequality in nonagricultural labor productivity 
almost doubled. Public investment's contribution to 
regional inequality in nonagricultural labor produc­
tivity increased by 118 percent from 14.4 percent to 
30.5 percent during the period.
The contribution of all the inputs to overall 
inequality was also assessed. Capital's contribution 
to worsening regional inequality increased from 8.5 
percent to 22 percent, although its shares in the 
inequality of agricultural and nonagricultural labor 
productivity changed negligibly. This change was 
probably due to a structural shift in capital from 
agricultural to nonagricultural production in the 
economy, because rural industry is more capital 
intensive than agriculture. Similarly, irrigation 
accounted for a decreasing share of overall inequal­
ity. The contributions of roads, agricultural RstD, 
electricity, and telecommunications increased 
significantly. These results thus suggest a regionally 
biased public investment strategy over the past two 
decades. The coastal region enjoyed the most 
favorable investment from the government.
Summarizing the Main Findings
The results of the case study show that govern­
ment spending on production-enhancing invest­
ments, such as agricultural R&D and irrigation, 
rural education, and infrastructure, all contributed 
to agricultural productivity growth and reduced 
regional inequality and rural poverty. Variations in 
their marginal effects on productivity growth, 
however, were large.
Government spending on education had the largest 
impact on poverty reduction and very high returns 
for growth in agriculture and the nonfarm sector, 
as well as for the rural economy as a whole. 
Among all the types of investments, additional 
spending on education in the less-developed areas 
also had the largest effect in reducing regional 
inequality.
Government spending on agricultural research and 
extension improved agricultural productivity 
significantly. This type of expenditure also had the 
largest returns to growth in agricultural production 
and overall production in the rural economy.
Government expenditure on rural telecommunica­
tions, electricity, and roads also had substantial 
marginal impact on rural poverty reduction. These 
poverty reduction effects came from improved 
nonfarm employment and increased rural wages. 
Road investment had the largest return to GDP 
growth in the nonfarm economy and the second- 
largest return to the overall rural economy, which 
was only slightly lower than RstD investment.
Irrigation investment had a modest impact on 
growth in agricultural production and even less 
impact on rural poverty reduction. Across regions, 
additional investments in the western region con­
tributed most to reducing poverty and regional 
inequality, because most of the poor were concen­
trated here. The poverty reduction effect of 
spending on education, agricultural RstD, and roads 
was especially high in the region. Economic returns 
to most investments, however, were larger in the 
central region.
Stakeholders
The previous sections have highlighted the impor­
tance of investments in rural infrastructure and 
other key public services that are necessary for
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achieving growth and reducing poverty in rural 
areas. The challenge for many developing countries 
is to find more effective ways to pay for additional 
public investments and to develop suitable institu­
tional arrangements for their delivery. What insti­
tutional reforms are necessary to make the delivery 
of infrastructure services more efficient, and what 
is the potential role of the private sector?
The Public Sector
In most countries the public sector is the dominant 
supplier of infrastructure services. The results have 
generally been disappointing. The state-owned 
monopoly on provision has resulted in high levels 
of waste and inefficiency [Brook and Smith 2001). 
According to one estimate, technical inefficiencies 
in power, roads, railways, and water alone caused 
losses of US$55 billion a year in the early 1990s in 
developing countries, which is equivalent to 1 
percent of all developing countries' GDP, a quarter 
of annual infrastructure investment, and twice the 
annual development finance necessary for infra­
structure (World Bank 1994).
At present policy makers interested in expanding 
access to infrastructure services in remote rural 
areas can draw on a rich body of experience that 
challenges existing ideas. Governments must 
address the question of how infrastructure services 
are paid for, which raises pricing issues. Second, 
when delivering services to the poor, governments 
should allow for a range of service options in 
developing private participation schemes. Third, 
encouraging competition can help reduce prices 
and expand access and should thus be used to the 
maximum extent feasible. Fourth, the quality of 
regulation matters; the key to developing regu­
latory frameworks is to make them credible to 
investors and to ensure they are viewed as serving 
consumers. Finally, the politics of all of these 
actions matters. Technocratic solutions may exist, 
but building consensus and ensuring trust and sup­
port for these policies will remain challenging.
The key questions in the allocation of public 
expenditures and the need for institutional reforms 
include:
■ Are market failures being tackled? If so, 
which ones, and how?
■ Are public expenditures for the sector 
adequate in addressing the sector issues?
■ Are distributive concerns being addressed 
by narrowly based targeting mechanisms?
■ Are services being provided efficiently, at 
least cost, and are they responsive to user 
demand?
■ Is there any way to reform the recurrent 
cost funding mechanism?
The Private Sector
A global trend toward liberalizing and privatizing 
infrastructure activities began in the early 1980s 
and gained strengthen in the 1990s. At the fore­
front of this movement have been the developing 
countries, motivated by the desire to increase the 
efficiency of service delivery, accelerate the expan­
sion of improved services, and bring a greater and 
more consistent consumer focus to service delivery 
[Brook and Smith 2001).
Between 1990 and 2000 private infrastructure 
projects in developing countries attracted more 
than US$680 billion of investment [World Bank 
2007). Privatization can be an effective way to 
improve efficiency, since private firms are more 
responsive to end-user needs. Privatization also 
encourages and facilitates the imposition of cost­
covering tariffs or user fees, thus addressing the 
problems of underpricing that vex many public 
sector enterprises. Greater efficiency and cost 
recovery allow firms to make investments and pro­
vide services that might not otherwise have been 
possible (Fan 2004). These characteristics also 
improve the government's fiscal condition by 
making available the same quality and quantity of 
services with smaller budgetary subsidies.
Although some results of private sector involve­
ment in providing infrastructure services have been 
positive, empirical testing remains difficult because 
ownership reforms in infrastructure usually take 
place in a context of broader economic reforms. 
Additionally, many infrastructure privatization pro­
grams are relatively recent, limiting the availability 
of time-series data to test propositions about 
poverty impact. Based on broad experience, how­
ever, it is evident that ownership reforms to sys­
tematically expand access to infrastructure will 
depend critically on their detailed design (Estache, 
Gomez-Lobo, and Leipziger 2000).
The critical question that remains is, what strategies 
should government follow in focusing on reforms
and pursuing private provision? A possible course 
of action might be to delay introducing private 
participation. This approach could allow time for 
market ideology to improve and boost the per­
formance of inefficient public sector enterprises, 
thus making them attractive to potential bidders.
The first possible drawback to this approach is that 
it has often proven difficult, if not impossible, to 
improve the performance of public sector enter­
prises. The private sector has demonstrated that 
even in very difficult environments [for example, 
the power sector in Georgia], it can substantially 
improve efficiency and the quality of service. Rely­
ing on public provision can increase the pressure to 
adopt a more rational pricing policy for infra­
structure, which will not only increase efficiency, 
but also increase reliance on funding from tax­
payers rather than users. This situation may reduce 
the resources available to invest in expanding 
services for the rural poor, which in turn has impli­
cations for poverty reduction and economic 
growth. A second possible drawback is that 
because the private sector can be reluctant to place 
its capital at risk in developing-country infra­
structure projects, governments may pursue 
options such as leases and management contracts. 
Management contracts, however, are often short 
term and may not lock in efficiency and produc­
tivity improvements. Moreover, because the private 
sector typically does not finance investment, 
approaches such as management contracts provide 
fewer pressures on them to commit to cost-cover­
ing tariffs. Thus, there should be some realism 
about the likely impact and benefits of these types 
of private participation schemes.
Whatever policies countries choose, governments 
cannot avoid the most important reality that infra­
structure services must be paid for, whether pro­
vision is public or private. The real issue regarding 
infrastructure provision in developing countries is 
not whether it is public or private, but whether 
more or less infrastructure will be provided.
The Role of Communities in Infrastructure 
Provision
Poor people and communities in developing coun­
tries are often viewed as beneficiaries or passive 
targets of interventions. They can also play a major 
role, however, in improving physical access to 
services, and government agencies need to
understand that the role of poor people goes 
beyond participation in public consultations.
The financial reality in many developing countries is 
that communities have no choice but to get 
involved in improving roads, ports, and bridges. 
Thus, community ownership and management of 
these types of infrastructure is a viable way of pro­
viding sustainable access to all. Some strong evi­
dence shows that when communities voluntarily 
own and manage local infrastructure, the cost of 
maintenance is significantly lower than when the 
same type of infrastructure is owned and managed 
by a public sector enterprise [Wellenius, Foster, 
and Malmberg-Calvo 2004],
Policy Options
Given that significant increases in public rural 
investment seem unlikely, countries will have to 
give greater emphasis to using their public invest­
ment resources more efficiently. This approach 
requires better targeting of investment to achieve 
growth and poverty alleviation goals, and improved 
efficiency within the agencies that provide public 
goods and services. Despite vast differences in eco­
nomic systems, natural sources endowments, 
socioeconomic conditions, and sizes, these case 
studies offer some important lessons.
Investing in Agricultural Research, Rural 
Infrastructure, and Education
Among the categories of investments, those in 
agricultural research, education, and rural infra­
structure were found to be the most effective in 
promoting agricultural growth and poverty reduc­
tion in both countries. Developing countries need 
to focus on these three high-priority sectors in 
allocating their limited public resources.
Investing in Less-Developed Areas
Developing countries also need to increase their 
investments in less-developed regions. These 
regions lag behind not only because of unfavorable 
natural resources and geographical location, but 
also because of government neglect. The cases of 
China and India show that returns to investment 
are very high in terms of poverty reduction. 
Evidence has also shown that in many such regions, 
returns to many investments are also higher in 
terms of growth.
Investing in Low-Quality, Low-Cost 
Infrastructure
The limited evidence from China and Uganda sug­
gests that it is often the low-quality, low-cost types 
of infrastructure, like feeder roads, that may have 
highest payoff in terms of growth and poverty 
reduction per unit of investment. Governments 
may begin to invest in this type of infrastructure in 
particular when the total government budget is 
limited.
Proper Targeting of Antipoverty Programs
Given that government spending on antipoverty 
programs generally had a negligible impact on 
poverty reduction, mainly owing to inefficiency in 
its targeting and misuse of funds, more efforts are 
needed to better target the funds to the poor. 
Otherwise, governments should use the invest­
ments to improve rural education and infra­
structure, which promote long-term growth and 
thereby offer a long-term solution to poverty 
reduction.
Assignment
Your assignment is to recommend a public sector 
investment strategy for rural infrastructure to be 
considered by the government of one of the two 
countries discussed in this case.
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